Abstract. We slightly improve on characterization results already in the literature for base revision. We show that consistency-based partial meet revision operators can be axiomatized for any sentential logic S satisfying finitarity and monotonicity conditions (neither the deduction theorem nor supraclassicality are required to hold in S). A characterization of limiting cases of revision operators, full meet and maxichoice, is also offered. In the second part of the paper, as a particular case, we focus on the class of graded fuzzy logics and distinguish two types of bases, naturally arising in that context, exhibiting different behavior.
Introduction
This paper is about (multiple) base belief change, in particular our results are mainly about base revision, which is characterized for a broad class of logics. The original framework of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] deals with belief change operators on deductively closed theories. This framework was generalized by Hansson [9, 10] to deal with bases, i.e. arbitrary set of formulas, the original requirement of logical closure being dropped. Hansson characterized revision and contraction operators in, essentially, monotonic compact logics with the deduction theorem property. These results were improved in [11] by Hansson and Wassermann: while for contraction ([11, Theorem 3.8] ) it is shown that finitarity and monotony of the underlying logic suffice, for revision (Theorem [11, Theorem 3 .17]) their proof depends on a further condition, Non-contravention: for all sentences ϕ, if ¬ϕ ∈ Cn S (T ∪ {ϕ}), then ¬ϕ ∈ Cn S (T ).
In this paper we provide a further improvement of Hansson and Wassermann's results by proving a characterization theorem for base revision in any finitary monotonic logic. Namely, in the context of partial meet base revision, we show that Non-contravention can be dropped in the characterization of revision if we replace the notion of unprovability (remainders) by consistency in the definition of partial meet, taking inspiration from [4] . This is the main contribution of the paper, together with its extension to the characterization of the revision operators corresponding to limiting cases of selection functions, i.e. full meet and maxichoice revision operators.
In the second part of the paper, as a particular class of finitary monotonic logics, we focus on graded fuzzy logics. We introduce there a distinction in basehood and observe some differences in the behavior of the corresponding base revision operators. This paper is structured as follows. First we introduce in Section 1 the necessary background material on logic and partial meet base belief change. Then in Section 2 we set out the main characterization results for base revision, including full meet and maxichoice revision operators. Finally in Section 3 we briefly introduce fuzzy graded logics, present a natural distinction between bases in these logics (whether or not they are taken to be closed under truth-degrees) and compare both kinds of bases.
Preliminaries on theory and base belief change
We introduce in this section the concepts and results needed later. Following [6] , we define a logic S as a finitary and structural consequence relation S ⊆ P(Fm) × Fm, for some algebra of formulas Fm 3 . Belief change is the study of how some theory T (non-necessarily closed, as we use the term) in a given language L can adapt to new incoming information ϕ ∈ L (inconsistent with T , in the interesting case). The main operations are: revision, where the new input must follow from the revised theory, which is to be consistent, and contraction where the input must not follow from the contracted theory. In the classical paper [1] , by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, partial meet revision and contraction operations were characterized for closed theories in, essentially, monotonic compact logics with the deduction property 4 . Their work put in solid grounds this newly established area of research, opening the way for other formal studies involving new objects of change, operations (see [14] for a comprehensive list) or logics. We follow [1] and define change operators by using partial meet: Partial meet consists in (i) generating all logically maximal ways to adapt T to the new sentence (those subtheories of T making further information loss logically unnecessary), (ii) selecting some of these possibilities, (iii) forming their meet, and, optionally, (iv) performing additional steps (if required by the operation). Then a set of axioms is provided to capture these partial meet operators, by showing equivalence between satisfaction of these axioms and being a partial meet operator 5 . In addition, new axioms may be introduced to characterize the limiting cases of selection in step (ii), full meet and maxichoice selection types. Finally, results showing the different operation types can be defined each other are usually provided too.
A base is an arbitrary set of formulas, the original requirement of logical closure being dropped. Base belief change, for the same logical framework than AGM, was characterized by Hansson (see [9] , [10] ). The results for contraction and revision were improved in [11] (by Hansson and Wassermann): for contraction ( [11, Theorem 3.8] ) it is shown that finitarity and monotony suffice, while for revision ([11, Theorem 3 .17]) their proof depends on a further condition, Noncontravention: for all sentences ϕ, if ¬ϕ ∈ Cn S (T ∪ {ϕ}), then ¬ϕ ∈ Cn S (T ). Observe this condition holds in logics having (i) the deduction property and (ii) the structural axiom of Contraction 6 . We show Non-contravention can be dropped in the characterization of revision if we replace unprovability (remainders) by consistency in the definition of partial meet.
The main difference between base and theory revision is syntax-sensitivity (see [12] and [3] for a discussion): two equivalent bases may output different solutions under a fixed revision operator and input (compare e.g. T = {p, q} and T = {p ∧ q} under revision by ¬p, which give {¬p, q} and {¬p} respectively). Another difference lies in maxichoice operations: for theory revision it was proved in [2] that: non-trivial revision maxichoice operations T ϕ output complete theories, even if T is far from being complete. This was seen as an argument against maxichoice. For base belief change, in contrast, the previous fact is not the case, so maxichoice operators may be simply seen as modeling optimal knowledge situations for a given belief change problem.
Multiple base revision for finitary monotonic logics.
Partial meet was originally defined in terms of unprovability of the contraction input sentences: remainders are maximal subsets of T failing to imply ϕ. This works fine for logics with the deduction theorem, where remainders and their consistency-based counterparts (defined below) coincide. But, for the general case, remainder-based revision does not grant consistency and it is necessary to adopt the consistency-based approach. Observe we also generalize revision operators to the multiple case, where the input of revision is allowed to be a base, rather than just a single sentence. [4] ) Given some monotonic logic S , let T 0 , T 1 be theories. We say T 0 is consistent if T 0 S 0, and define the set Con(T 0 , T 1 ) of subsets of T 0 maximally consistent with T 1 as follows: X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ) iff:
sets and incision functions on kernels; ranking-based mechanisms include entrenchments and systems of spheres. For the logical framework assumed in the original developments (compact -and monotonic-closure operators satisfying the deduction property), all these methods are equivalent (see [14] for a comparison). These equivalences between methods need not be preserved in more general class of logics. 6 If T ∪ {ϕ} S ϕ → 0, then by the deduction property T S ϕ → (ϕ → 0); i.e. T S (ϕ&ϕ) → 0. Finally, by transitivity and the axiom of contraction, S ϕ → ϕ&ϕ, we obtain T S ϕ → 0.
Now we prove some properties 7 of Con(·, ·) which will be helpful for the characterization theorems of base belief change operators for arbitrary finitary monotonic logics. Lemma 1. Let S be some finitary logic and T 0 a theory. For any X ⊆ T 0 , if X ∪ T 1 is consistent, then X can be extended to some Y with Y ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ).
; that is, each Y i is a subset of T 0 and consistent with T 1 . Hence, i∈I Y i ⊆ T 0 ; since S is finitary, i∈I Y i is also consistent with T 1 and hence is an upper bound for the chain. Applying Zorn's Lemma, we obtain an element Z in the poset with the next properties: X ⊆ Z ⊆ T and Z maximal w.r.t. Z ∪ {ϕ} S 0. Thus X ⊆ Z ∈ Con(T, ϕ). Remark 1. Considering X = ∅ in the preceding lemma, we infer: if T 1 is consistent, then Con(T 0 , T 1 ) = ∅.
For simplicity, we assume that the input base T 1 (to revise T 0 by) is consistent. Now, the original definition of selection functions is modified according to the consistency-based approach.
Definition 2. Let T 0 be a theory. A selection function for T 0 is a function
Thus, selection functions and revision operators are defined relative to some fixed base T 0 . Although, instead of writing T0 T 1 , we use the traditional infix notation T 0 T 1 for the operation of revising base T 0 by T 1 .
Base belief revision.
The axioms we propose (inspired by [4] ) to characterize (multiple) base revision operators for finitary monotonic logics S are the following, for arbitrary sets T 0 , T 1 :
Given some theory T 0 ⊆ Fm and selection function γ for T 0 , we define the partial meet revision operator γ for T 0 by T 1 ⊆ Fm as follows:
Definition 3. Let S be some finitary logic, and T 0 a theory. Then : P(Fm) → P(Fm) is a revision operator for T 0 iff for any
Lemma 2. The condition Con(T 0 , T 1 ) = Con(T 0 , T 2 ) is equivalent to the antecedent of Axiom (F5) Finally, we are in conditions to prove the main characterization result for partial meet revision. Theorem 1. Let S be a finitary monotonic logic. For any T 0 ⊆ Fm and function : P(Fm) → P(Fm):
is a revision operator for T 0
Proof. (Soundness) Given some partial meet revision operator γ for T 0 , we
∈ T 1 and for some X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )), ψ / ∈ X. Simply put T = X ∪ T 1 : by definitions of γ and Con we have (i) T 0 γ T 1 ⊆ T ⊆ T 0 ∪ T 1 and (ii) T is consistent (since T 1 is). We also have (iii) T ∪ {ψ} is inconsistent (otherwise ψ ∈ X would follow from maximality of X and ψ ∈ T 0 , hence contradicting our previous step ψ / ∈ X). (F5) We have to show, assuming the antecedent of(F5),
. We prove the ⊆ direction only since the other is similar. Assume, then, for all T ⊆ T 0 , T 1 ) ). Then we use Lemma 2 upon the assumption to obtain γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) = γ(Con(T 0 , T 2 )), since γ is a function. Case ψ ∈ T 0 ∩ T 1 . Then ψ ∈ X for all X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )), by maximality of X. Hence, ψ ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )). Using the same argument than in the former case, ψ ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 2 )). Since we also assumed ψ ∈ T 0 , we obtain ψ ∈ T 0 ∩ (T 0 γ T 2 ). (Completeness) Let satisfy (F1) − (F5). We have to show that for some selection function γ and any
We prove that (1) γ is well-defined, (2) γ is a selection function and (3)
(1) Assume (i) Con(T 0 , T 1 ) = Con(T 0 , T 2 ); we prove that γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) = γ(Con(T 0 , T 2 )). Applying Lemma 2 to (i) we obtain the antecedent of (F5). Since satisfies this axiom, we have (ii)
By the above definition of γ, γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) = γ(Con(T 0 , T 2 )) follows from (i) and (ii).
(2) Since T 1 is consistent, by Remark 1 we obtain Con(T 0 , T 1 ) is not empty; we have to show that γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) is not empty either (since the other condition γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) ⊆ Con(T 0 , T 1 ) is met by the above definition of γ). We have T 0 ∩ T 0 T 1 ⊆ T 0 T 1 ; the latter is consistent and contains T 1 , by (F2) and (F1), respectively; thus, (T 0 ∩T 0 T 1 )∪T 1 is consistent; from this and T 0 ∩T 0 T 1 ⊆ T 0 , we deduce by Lemma 1 that T 0 ∩ T 0 T 1 is extensible to some X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ). Thus, exists some X ∈ Con(T 0 ,
For (3), we prove first
This implies, by definition of γ above, that for all X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) we have ψ ∈ X, so that ψ ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) ⊆ T 0 γ T 1 . In both cases, we obtain ψ ∈ T 0 γ T 1 . Now, for the other direction:
By (F1), we have T 1 ∈ T 0 T 1 ; then, in case ψ ∈ T 1 we are done. So we may assume ψ ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )). Now, in order to apply (F4), let X be arbitrary with T T 1 ⊆ X ⊆ T 0 ∪ T 1 and X consistent. Consider X ∩ T 0 : since
Observe that from X ⊆ X ∪T 1 and X ⊆ T 0 ∪T 1 we infer that X ⊆ (X ∪T 1 )∩ (T 0 ∪T 1 ). From the latter being identical to (X ∩T 0 )∪T 1 and the fact that (
, we have Y ∪ T 1 is consistent with ψ, so its subset X is also consistent with ψ. Finally, we may apply modus tollens on Axiom (F4) to obtain that ψ / ∈ T 0 − T 0 T 1 , i.e. ψ / ∈ T 0 or ψ ∈ T 0 T 1 . But since the former is false, the latter must be the case.
Full meet and maxichoice base revision operators. The previous result can be extended to limiting cases of selection functions formally defined next.
Definition 4.
A revision operator for T 0 is full meet if it is generated by the identity selection function γ fm = Id: γ fm (Con(T 0 , T 1 )) = Con(T 0 , T 1 ); that is,
A revision operator for T 0 is maxichoice if it is generated by a selection function of type γ mc (Con(T 0 , T 1 )) = {X}, for some X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ), and in that case T 0 γmc T 1 = X ∪ T 1 .
To characterize full meet and maxichoice revision operators for some theory T 0 in any finitary logic, we define the next additional axioms:
Theorem 2. Let T 0 ⊆ Fm and be a function : P(Fm) 2 → P(Fm). Then the following hold:
Proof. We prove (fm) first. (Soundness): We know γ fm satisfies (F1) − (F5) so it remains to be proved that (FM) holds. Let X be such that T 1 ⊆ X ⊆ T 0 ∪ T 1 and X S 0. From the latter and
, for some Y . Notice X = X ∪ T 1 and that for any X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ) X ∪ T 1 is consistent and
Since the latter is consistent, T 0 fm T 1 ∪ X S 0. (Completeness) Let satisfy (F1) − (F5) and (FM). It suffices to prove that X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) ⇔ X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ); but we already know that = γ , for selection function γ (for T 0 ) defined by:
and X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ), we have by maximality of X that either X ∪ {ψ} S 0 or ψ ∈ X. We prove the former case to be impossible: assuming it we would have
we would obtain X ∪ {ψ} S 0, hence contradicting the case assumption; since the former case is not possible, we have ψ ∈ X. Since X was arbitrary, X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ) implies X ⊆ T 0 ∩ T 0 T 1 and we are done. For (mc): (Soundness) We prove (MC), since (F1) − (F5) follow from γmc being a partial meet revision operator. Let X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ) be such that T 0 γmc ϕ = X ∪ T 1 and let ψ ∈ T 0 − T 0 γmc T 1 . We have ψ / ∈ X ∪ T 1 = T 0 T 1 . Since ψ ∈ T 0 and X ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ), X ∪ {ψ} S 0. Finally T 0 T 1 ∪{ψ} S 0. (Completeness) Let satisfy (F1) − (F5) and (MC). We must prove = γmc , for some maxichoice selection function γ mc . Let X, Y ∈ Con(T 0 , T 1 ); we have to prove X = Y . In search of a contradiction, assume the contrary, i.e. ψ ∈ X − Y . We have ψ / ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) and ψ ∈ X ⊆ T 0 . By MC, T 0 T 1 ∪ {ψ} S 0. Since T 0 T 1 ⊆ X, we obtain X ∪{ψ} is also inconsistent, contradicting previous ψ ∈ X S 0. Thus X = Y which makes = γmc , for some maxichoice selection function γ mc .
3 The case of graded fuzzy logics.
The characterization results for base revision operators from the previous section required weak assumptions (monotony and finitarity) upon the consequence relation S . In particular these results hold for a wide family of systems of mathematical fuzzy logic. The distinctive feature of these logics is that they cope with graded truth in a compositional manner (see [8] ). Graded truth may be dealt implicitly, by means of comparative statements, or explicitly, by introducing truth-degrees in the language. Here we will focus on a particular kind of fuzzy logical languages allowing for explicit representation of truth-degrees, that will be referred as graded fuzzy logics, and which are expansions of t-norm logics with countable sets of truth-constants, see e.g. [5] . These logics allow for occurrences of truth-degrees, represented as new propositional atoms r (one for each r ∈ C) in any part of a formula. These truth-constants and propositional variables can be combined arbitrarily using connectives to obtain new formulas. The graded language obtained in this way will be denoted as Fm(C). A prominent example of a logic over a graded language is Hájek's Rational Pavelka Logic RPL [8] , an extension of Lukasiewicz logic with rational truth-constants in [0, 1]; for other graded extensions of t-norm based fuzzy logics see e.g. [5] . In t-norm based fuzzy logics, due to the fact that the implication is residuated, a formula r → ϕ gets value 1 under a given interpretation e iff r ≤ e(ϕ). In what follows, we will also use the signed language notation (ϕ, r) to denote the formula r → ϕ.
If S denotes a given t-norm logic, let us denote by S(C) the corresponding expansion with truth-constants from a suitable countable set C such that {0, 1} ⊂ C ⊆ [0, 1]. For instance if S is Lukasiewicz logic and C = Q ∩ [0, 1], then S(C) would refer to RPL. For these graded fuzzy logics, besides the original definition of a base as simply a set of formulas, it makes sense to consider another natural notion of basehood, where bases are closed by lower bounds of truth-degrees. We call them C-closed bases.
Definition 5. (Adapted from [9] ) Given some (monotonic) t-norm fuzzy logic S with language Fm and a countable set C ⊂ [0, 1] of truth-constants, let T ⊆ Fm(C) be a base in S(C). We define Cn C (T ) = {(ϕ, r ) : (ϕ, r) ∈ T, for r, r ∈ C with r ≥ r }. A base T ⊆ Fm(C) is called C-closed when T = Cn C (T ).
Notice that, using Gerla's framework of abstract fuzzy logic [7] , Booth and Ricther [4] define revision operators for bases which are closed with respect to truth-values in some complete lattice W .
The following results prove γ operators preserve C-closure, thus making C-closed revision a particular case of base revision under Theorem 1. Proposition 1. If T 0 , T 1 are C-closed graded bases, for any partial meet revision operator γ , T 0 γ T 1 is also a C-closed graded base.
Proof. Since T 0 is C-closed, by maximality of X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) we have X is also C-closed, for any such X. Let (ψ, s) ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) and s < C s for some s ∈ C. Then (ψ, s) ∈ X for any X ∈ γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) implies (ψ, s ) ∈ X for any such X. Hence γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 )) is C-closed. Finally, since T 1 is C-closed, we deduce γ(Con(T 0 , T 1 ))∪ T 1 is also C-closed.
Let P C (Fm) be the set of C-closed sets of Fm sentences. We introduce an additional axiom (F0) for revision of C-closed bases by C-closed inputs:
(F0) T 0 T 1 is C-closed, if T 0 , T 1 are Corollary 1. Assume S and C are as before and let : P C (Fm) → P(Fm). Then, satisfies (F0) − (F5) iff for some selection function γ, T 0 T 1 = T 0 γ T 1 for every T 1 ∈ P C (Fm).
Conclusions.
We improved Hansson and Wassermann characterization of revision operators in a class of logics without the deduction property. Apart from the general theorem, standard results for full meet and maxichoice revision operators are also provided. Then we moved to the field of graded fuzzy logics, in contradistinction to the approach by Booth and Richter in [4] ; their work inspired us to prove similar results for a more general logical framework, including t-norm based fuzzy logics from Hájek. Finally, we observed the differences between revision for bases if they are assumed to be closed under truth-degrees.
